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Chapter 15 
Making Reparations Possible: 
Theorizing Reparative Justice 
Margaret Urban Walker 
To hold that redressing a wrong is an obligation of justice is to hold that some remedial action is 
(at least prima facie) necessary, something that morally must be done. The requirements of justice 
are usually understood to be ones that we are required to meet in all cases in which practical 
circumstances are not so dire or chaotic as to prevent our performance, and in which no other 
obligations of comparable gravity or urgency conflict. It is curious, then, how often arguments 
in recent theoretical literature on reparations for massive violence and abuse aim to show that 
reparations are impossible (or nearly impossible)-logically, morally, or practically-to make. 
Some claim to show that, regrettably, the very worst among actual injustices-atrocity, genocide, 
slavery, dispossession, and the like-are ones for which just repair is simply impossible. Yet these 
are the very cases for which we invoke the concept of reparations. 
The absence of theory concerning justice in repair is curious as well. Despite vast and varied 
theoretical literatures on distributive and retributive justice, with competing positions grounded 
in philosophical commitments and tested by practical implications, the contemporary theoretical 
literature on reparative justice remains relatively slight. To begin with (and not inconsequentially), 
there is no uniformly agreed-upon terminology for the kind of justice in question. While many 
authors speak of corrective or (in an older tradition) commutative justice, others speak of 
compensatory, rectificatory, reparatory, or reparative justice, without clarification about whether 
these are labels for the same kind of theory or principle. There is relatively little in the way of 
genuine theories of reparative justice. Instead, many writers assume or invoke some version of 
the principle that justice requires a victim of wrongdoing to be returned by the wrongdoer to the 
state the victim enjoyed prior to, or would have enjoyed in the absence of, the wrong. This is, 
of course, Aristotle's conception of commutative (or corrective) justice. But whatever luster of 
authority that philosophical pedigree imparts to corrective justice, its more immediate referent 
is legal practice concerning remedies for unjust harms and losses, where responsible parties are 
required to make restitution to wronged individuals, or pay them compensation in proportion to 
harm or loss, in cases of tort or breach of contract. The principle of corrective justice is for the party 
at fault to restore the prior condition of the wronged party as nearly as possible by wiping out the 
consequences of the wrong. 
To illustrate the poverty of such narrow thinking about reparative justice, I begin with a number 
of arguments in very recent theoretical writing on reparations that aim to show that justice in repair 
is defective or deceptive, where it is possible at all. I call them "impossibility arguments." They 
share the assumption that justice in repair is identical to or exhausted by corrective justice: justice 
in repair consists in cancelling out or reversing wrongful harms, typically by means of restitution 
or proportionate compensation. I propose that we see impossibility arguments, resting on the 
corrective justice premise, as reductio arguments: if reparations are necessary as obligations of 
justice, they must typically be possible; if certain assumptions about the nature of reparative justice 
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make them (nearly or commonly) impossible, then those assumptions must be incorrect. Reliance 
on the corrective justice assumption represents a failure to pursue an adequate theory of (what I 
will call) 'reparative justice', the broadest genus of justice in repair. A theory of reparative justice 
must expose its core concerns, guiding aims, and implications in practice. A useful theory would 
also identifY the specific challenges and limits, including sources of resistance, to justice in repair. 
I will offer in broad outline an account of the nature and guiding aim of reparative justice. My 
view takes as a reference point the new contemporary practice of political reparations for mass 
violence and systemic human rights abuse that emerged in the mid-twentieth century. This nascent 
practice, I will argue below, is an important reference point for the theory of reparative justice. It 
has resulted (and will no doubt continue to develop) through tests and struggles that can be seen 
as a set of experiments in discovering what constitutes and signifies justice in repair, however 
imperfect, for massive human rights crimes. An adequate account of reparative justice ought 
not only to cohere with but to explain prominent features of this new practice, especially for my 
purposes here, the diversity of measures that embody justice in repair. Finally, corrective justice 
ought to find a place within this broader account; I think it can be seen as one implementation of 
reparative justice within a certain institutional framework under certain political conditions. 
Impossibility Arguments 
A surprising number of current arguments concerning reparations for mass violence and political 
repression aim to show that reparative justice is impossible or irrelevant. A number of very recent 
papers illustrate common ways of thinking about reparative justice that result in impossibility 
arguments (Du Plessis and Pete 2007; Williams et al. 2012). Some arguments aim to deflate or 
abuse the idea of corrective justice in response to massive harms while others aim to displace the 
application of reparative justice in favor of "prospective," "forwarding looking," or distributive 
justice. All of these arguments assume that justice in repair of wrongs is corrective justice, so 
whether the standard of corrective justice is fulfilled determines whether reparations, envisioned 
or made, are true, real, "first-best," adequate, serious, or meaningful as attempts at justice. The 
conclusion in various versions is that reparations are doomed to inadequacy; in the benign case 
they fail at doing justice while in the worst case they impede justice or violate it. 
Gary Bass argues that reparations are at best a "noble lie," since atrocity or genocide "cannot be 
undone" and compensation for such crimes "can never be adequate if measured against the depth of 
the wound" (Bass 2012: 167 and 171 ). Bass places reparations in parallel to war crimes tribunals, 
calling reparations a kind of war tort. By the corrective justice standard of "normal tort law" ( 169) 
that requires compensation in proportion to injury, reparations cannot be other than a "tokenistic 
measure ... to mollifY the victims ... " (167). While he recognizes that in some cases victims seek 
admissions and apologies instead of or in addition to compensation, justice demands proportionate 
compensation (171 ). This argument may seem simplistic, but I have heard versions of it on many 
occasions in discussion: reparations are inherently wrong-headed or incoherent because we cannot 
change the past or undo what has been done. It is worth remarking this kind of argument, not only 
for its equation of money payments with "real" justice, but because it is problematic in two other 
ways. No one is more acutely aware than victims of grave wrongs that there is no undoing many 
of them; what they seek as reparations can hardly be that. On the other hand, in some cases what 
has happened in the past may indeed be "undone" and is exactly what victims seek: return of land, 
restoration of rights and status, or the correction of false history. 
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Jon Elster, in the same volume, shares the idea that only material reparations are real 
reparations. But while Bass sees symbolic gestures as noble, or at least kindly, Elster scorns them. 
In the aftermath of widespread abuses, he argues, there are demands of distributive, retributive, 
restitutive, and compensatory justice to be met (Elster 2012: 80). When it comes to reparations, 
"Unless governments are willing to put their money where their mouth is," it is nothing but "cheap 
talk," including official apologies, which are likely to be "meaningless," "absurd," or "empty" 
(86). If, on the other hand, governments do fund reparations, they might unjustly "punish" non-
victims or collateral victims if reparations draw resources away from compelling distributive 
justice demands (92-3). In any case, "full reparation at a large scale may be economically 
unfeasible" (93). Reparations, seen as corrective compensation, are probably unwise if not unjust, 
and often impossible. 
Adrian Vermeule also assumes that reparation means compensation and that corrective 
compensation in reparations is chronically inadequate. But it is no more "disastrously unprincipled" 
than the ordinary legal system of corrective justice (Vermeule 2012: 163). In many such cases, 
Vermeule argues, inadequate and non-individuated compensation fails to satisfy justice but responds 
to an unprincipled sense of"roughjustice," an intuition that some compensation is better than none 
at all (151 ). While reparations are "indefensible on any plausible first-best criterion of justice," and 
although there may be problems of unequal treatment among the compensated, and between the 
compensated and the uncompensated, this second-best is not more objectionable than what goes 
on in ordinary corrective justice. Vermeule thus defends reparations, but not because it answers 
to any principled idea or conception of justice appropriate to its own aims and demands. In other 
words, to say that it is rough justice is to say it's not really justice at all, and to say that arbitrary 
compensation is better than none at all suggests that compensation, and only compensation, is at 
issue in the justice of repair. 
Other arguments claim that reparations are not really best understood as an exercise of 
backward-looking justice at all, or that if they are so understood, they are superseded or preempted 
by forward-looking distributive justice demands. These arguments say, in effect, that if we seek 
justice in addressing wrongs we should adopt forward-looking or distributive justice as our guide 
(see also Wenar 2006 and Pierik 2006). 
Writing on expropriated land in former communist countries, Christopher Kutz argues that 
corrective justice is a distinct and valid normative ground for justice in repair, and one that 
embodies ideals of accountability, but it is often "the wrong framework for considering reparative 
claims" (Kutz 2004: 302). Because corrective justice rectifies wrongful invasions of entitlements it 
is dependent for its force on a distributively just scheme of entitlements (297). As a consequence, 
a state has "no business" meeting reparations claims in those cases where it is unable to ensure 
minimally adequate standards of living generally (301). Applied generally, Kutz's claim for the 
priority of distributive justice would put material reparations-and possibly symbolic ones that 
too have their cost--out of bounds in most cases. Given the serious distributive injustice of most 
societies even by minimal standards, limited resources should be put to the more fundamental 
work of distributive justice. If there is an argument for return of expropriated land, he argues, that 
argument will be one of distributive justice, where a group is entitled to its land as a condition of 
continuing its tradition and culture (31 0). Kutz sees the reparative value of symbolic recognition, 
including symbolic monetary payments, as acknowledgment of "the legal and moral subjectivity 
of the victims" (284). But he seems to see these as forward-looking questions of national identity 
being reconstructed or transformed (281-3). It is unclear what space is left in his scheme for a 
kind of reparative justice-neither corrective nor retributive-that grounds independent claims of 
redress for victims of specific grievous wrongs in the past. 
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Jeremy Webber argues that reparations (and other transitional justice measures) are often about 
"prospective justice" that seeks to bring parties into relationship on a just foundation for the future 
(Webber 2012: 104 ). Retrospective corrective justice, on the other hand, involves a "narrow optic" 
that simply seeks to reverse a wrongful transaction without addressing broader questions (121 ). 
Even payment often functions symbolically, as an "earnest" to lend weight to apologies or other 
measures that look forward to better future relations. ( 1 05). While reparations programs can partake 
of both backward-looking corrective compensation of individuals and constructively forward-
looking reconstruction of relationships, these forms of justice operate by "very different logics" 
( 1 07). They pose choices, and potentially dilemmas, about whether "to focus on the nature of past 
wrongs" or "to manage parties' relations from here on" (108). So, where Kutz finds a dependency 
of corrective justice on distributive justice, Webber finds a tension between two independent and 
competing principles. 
Webber illustrates this claim with the case of indigenous peoples, who may seek redress 
through actual land restitution but also seek to reconstitute their relationship through prospective 
claims to greater resources and autonomy (111-12). Indeed, Webber points out, they might be 
willing to forego retrospective remedies to secure self-determination (112). While this claim about 
some indigenous peoples might be correct, it establishes only that cases of profound, multifaceted, 
extended, and deeply destructive histories of relationship between people or peoples may give 
rise to multiple justice claims of distinct types that compete for resources, practical priority, and 
political traction. What it does not show is that reparative justice is exhausted by corrective justice 
and its modes of redress for the past are confined to that "narrow optic" of reversing an unjust 
transaction. If corrective justice alone redresses the past, then where corrective justice cannot be 
done the past cannot be the focus of justice, and justice claims must look to the future instead. What 
:s missing is an examination of diverse ways, beyond corrective justice, that reparative justice can 
[
' ngage the past and attempt redress. In the choice between past and future, the actual scene of 
eparations struggles-the present-is not in view. 
While Kutz has corrective and distributive justice as distinct normative principles with a 
riority ordering, and Webber sees them as principles with divergent temporal orientations that 
can be in tension, Michael Freeman sees corrective justice as a proper part of distributive justice, 
because it "specifies rightful (re)distribution" (Freeman 2012: 39). Surprisingly, however, Freeman 
argues that the focus on rectifYing past wrongs makes reparative justice "conceptually distinct" and 
its claims possibly incompatible with distributive justice, especially in cases of historical injustice 
(14). The claim that reparative justice is a part of distributive justice, however, turns out to be no 
more than nominal, for reparative justice for Freeman is simply corrective justice, expressed in the 
principle, "If A wrongfully harms B, then in the absence of overriding considerations, A should 
compensate B for the wrong" (29); or, more concisely, "The first principle of reparative justice is 
that the wrongdoer pays" (39). Freeman rehearses many familiar objections to reparative justice so 
conceived. His paper ends, however, with the acknowledgment that "We have no comprehensive 
and integrated theory of reparative justice" (50). Given this, one wonders why Freeman is sure 
what its first principle is. In any case, he concludes that " ... the more difficult it is to achieve 
reparative justice, the more it should be dominated by distributive justice" ( 49). 
Current impossibility arguments echo a famous prototype, Jeremy Waldron's argument that 
claims for repair of historical injustices such as land theft are likely to be "superseded" by present 
and future distributive claims. Waldron says, " .. . it is the impulse to justice now that should lead 
the way in this process, not the reparation of something whose wrongness is understood primarily 
in relation to conditions that no longer obtain" (Waldron 1992: 27). In variations on a theme, 
current impossibility arguments purport to show that what is done as reparations is deceptive or 
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wrong-headed; that it is merely "symbolic" in a deflationary sense; that what might be done is 
actually a different kind of justice, something other than justice, or something contrary to justice; 
or that reparative justice should be left aside in favor of another kind of justice. Most of all, it looks 
in the wrong direction, to an inert and unrecoverable past. 
I don't mean to suggest that there are no constructive arguments concerning reparations that are 
rooted in a corrective justice approach (see Winter 2006 and 2014, Bernstein 2009, and Sammons 
2012 for diverse examples). Yet many have argued that a "juridical," or "tort," or "corrective justice" 
model is often inadequate or unhelpful applied precisely to the kinds of cases that reparations 
are meant to address, including mass violence in conflict, genocide and crimes against humanity, 
systemic gross human rights violations, severe political repression, or extreme intergenerational 
injustices with long histories (Thompson 2002; Brooks 2004; De Greiff 2006b; Walker 2006a; 
Yamamoto et al. 2007; Satz 2007; Verdeja 2007; Gray 201 Oa; Philpott 2012). Here I add the point 
that corrective justice not only fails to guide understanding or action in many such cases, but can 
function affirmatively as a lever to deflect, demote, or dismiss reparations claims as hopeless, 
wrong-headed, or destructive. Impossibility arguments serve a kind of reparations skepticism at 
a time when a distinctive new global practice and "reparations ethos" has been taking form (Falk 
2006: 485; see also Barkan 2000). 
A New Practice of Reparations 
If we think that reparations for these massive and complex wrongs are indeed a requirement of 
justice, we need alternative ways of theorizing the concerns, aims, and measures of reparative 
justice. In doing so, I believe we should study the new practice of reparations that emerged in the 
later twentieth century, a practice that has been shaped by activities by and on behalf of victims 
of human rights violations and historical injustice around the globe. The multiform character of 
reparations in this new practice sets a task for the theory of reparative justice: to understand what 
are the underlying concerns that explain the complexity and diversity of reparations. 
It is widely agreed that the payment of reparations by West Germany to individual survivors of 
the Holocaust after WWII introduced a genuinely new practice, treating individuals, and not only 
nations, as the subjects of claims against states for reparations for grave violations (Colonomos 
2006). Extensive programs of reparations for victims and families were instituted in waves in 
the aftermath of brutal military governments in Latin American countries, especially Chile and 
Argentina, that engaged in repression, torture, disappearance, and illegal detention of their citizens. 
The United States legislated a reparations program in 1988 for Japanese-Americans interned 
during the World War Two, over 40 years after the events. After two decades of study, the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2005 endorsed the "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations oflnternational Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" distilling a set of measures for making full 
and effective reparation, understood as a human right in the case of severe abuses (United Nations 
2006). The Basic Principles did not invent this new practice of reparations. It has developed out 
of popular and civil society movements representing the needs and expectations of victims and 
their societies as well as the work of domestic and international institutions. The Basic Principles 
consolidated a wide-ranging and accelerating set of developments in many places: actual programs 
of reparations; recommendations of appropriate reparations by truth commissions; decisions by 
international courts (especially the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); reparations by private 
entities; reparations proposals and demands by NGOs and victim advocacy groups; domestic and 
216 Theorizing Transitional Justice 
international lawsuits seeking compensation; and legal and academic scholarship (see De Greiff 
2006; Johnston and Slyomovics 2009; Du Plessis and Pete 2007). 
Section IX of the Basic Principles stress five categories of reparations measures. The first two 
are the familiar ones of restitution, interpreted broadly to include liberty, legal standing, residence, 
citizenship, and employment, and compensation for both economically assessable and moral 
damage. A third is medical, psychological, social, and legal rehabilitation services. The last two 
categories involve very diverse interventions. Satisfaction includes eight distinct measures: to 
stop ongoing violations; to verify and disclose the truth publicly; to search for and rebury those 
disappeared or abducted; to officially declare the reputation and rights of victims; to apologize 
publicly; to sanction responsible parties administratively or judicially; to commemorate and 
honor victims; and to include an accurate account of violations in educational materials. The final 
category, guarantees of non-repetition, includes various preventive measures including institutional 
reforms: an independent judiciary; due process guarantees; civilian control of the military; training 
and education of public officials; monitoring; and institutional and legal reforms. These are all 
measures that have been recommended repeatedly in truth commission reports and are increasingly 
ordered by some international courts (Schonsteiner 2007). 
I want to call attention to three features of the practice described. First, the Basic Principles are 
addressed to states, and state responsibility for reparations is assumed. Several kinds of measures 
mentioned can only be provided by state institutions. Where other persons or entities are liable, they 
should provide reparations; if other liable parties are unable or unwilling, states should establish 
national programs. Second, the Principles expressly recognize that victimization of individual 
persons may also be directed against groups of persons who are targeted collectively, and that states 
should develop procedures to allow groups of victims to pursue reparations. These two features 
are not my principal concern here, but they suggest significant dimensions in which the corrective 
justice model-with its individualized picture of injury and liability to compensate-does not 
capture or explain distinctive features of the practice. 
It is the third feature I want to emphasize here. The Basic Principles do not rank the different 
categories of reparations measures. Restitution and compensation are paradigmatic legal remedies, 
but practice has revealed that acknowledgment, responsibility-taking, truth telling, apology, and 
memorialization, as well as credible guarantees of non-repetition, often tum out to be foremost 
in importance to individuals and groups who have suffered human rights abuses (in contrast, for 
interstate remedies, see Shelton 2002). The common distinction between "material" and "symbolic" 
reparations, while useful for some purposes, can be very misleading here. A symbol or symbolic 
gesture is what stands in for or represents something else that is absent or only indicated. To call 
some reparations-such as apologies, truth telling, or commemoration-"symbolic" is to imply 
that they are not the real thing. Yet one thing learned in contemporary reparations attempts is how 
essential it is to victims of wrongs that money be accompanied by, or be part of, truth telling, 
responsibility-taking, and gestures of respect toward victims. Even where it is necessary, money is 
not sufficient (see Hamber 2009 and Mazurana et al. 2013). Money may be refused or understood 
as insulting in the absence of honest accountability, respectful recognition, and clear admission 
of wrongs. The "materiaVsymbolic" distinction also fails to capture the concrete but expressive 
role played by preventive reforms. To undertake major change in societal institutions is costly in 
money as well as social and political capital; but as part of a program of reparations it also sends to 
victims and to society at large the message that what happened to the victims is simply intolerable 
and cannot be allowed to happen again. 
The diversity of measures that constitute reparations is striking; these measures recognize, 
respect, enable, and support victims not only materially, but psychologically, legally, civically, and 
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politically. Restitution and compensation have a central role, and in many cases there can be no 
substitute for material redress. But there are other essential dimensions of reparations, including 
gestures and actions that dignify and empower victims and that stress a societal commitment to 
structural reform so that the suffering of victims is not repeated. While some of these reparative 
measures could in principle be implemented by individuals responsible for wrongs, most of them 
are or entail societal responsibilities for publicly communicating the dignity and deservingness of 
victims and society's obligation to create the conditions in which victims can not only deal with 
their injuries but continue their lives as full civil and political actors. These measures thus address 
a problem larger than discrete injury; they recognize a problem of social and political standing that 
may be both a cause and a result of gross violations. A theory of reparative justice should try to 
illuminate what the multiform reparations agenda is seeking to address. 
Rethinking Reparative Justice 
Several new approaches in theorizing reparative justice have emerged. They have in common a 
focus on the roles of reparations (and other post-conflict or transitional measures) in reconfiguring 
or reconstituting the flawed moral and political relationships that invite abuses and are revealed 
by the specific forms abuses take. The point is not restoring the status quo ante but affirming a 
new baseline for moral and political engagement going forward. These accounts are not uncritical 
concerning reparations efforts; they offer normative perspectives from which reparations attempts 
can be found more or less apt or adequate. They are not skeptical of the project of reparations 
as such; instead, they are prompted by new and diverse forms of reparations and by renewed 
attention to questions ofhistorical injustice. Many of these theories see reparations as establishing 
new relationships of recognition, trust, equality, respect, atonement, or reconciliation (on civic 
recognition and trust, see De Greiff 2006b; on relations of respect and reciprocity, see Thompson 
2002, Satz 2007, Verdeja 2007, and Murphy 2010). The central idea of my own view is that 
reparations are about demonstrating (rather than establishing) relations of accountability and 
reciprocity that no process or program of reparations can itself guarantee. Reparations are a 
medium for the contentious yet hopeful negotiation in the present of proper recognition of the past 
and proper terms of relation for the future. As such they require mutually reinforcing commitments 
in multiple registers of relationship: money, acknowledgment, public ritual, social change. 
Corrective justice-the idea that one party or group can hold another to account for wrongful 
harm suffered, can pose terms of restitution or compensation, and can seek a resolution in that 
way-presupposes that parties stand in relations of effective accountability and reciprocity, and 
can activate these relations through institutional channels when they seek correction or redress. 
Where, for example, a legal system gives its citizens rights to a remedy for unjust harms or losses 
they have suffered and where citizens in fact have access to the institutions that can provide or 
enforce those remedies, corrective justice describes one standard implementation of justice 
in repair. Even in societies that provide this legal avenue, however, not all citizens may have 
equal access to these institutions and some may have none. Some citizens may not have reason 
to expect a fair hearing or may find that a legal system that historically permitted or enforced 
their oppression, dispossession, or subordination now sets terms for remedies that disqualify their 
claims, as unsuccessful legal actions by African-Americans for corporate reparations have found 
(Brophy 2006 and Sammons 2012). Yet it is the absence of precisely these relations that lies at the 
root of many of the profound harms and gross abuses where reparations are sought. Relationships 
of accountability and reciprocity may not have obtained at the root historically, as in the case 
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of chattel slavery in the United States and its aftermaths of segregation, domination, and racial 
violence. They might have been inconsistent and fragile, as in the case of treaties and alliances 
made with indigenous peoples and then quickly and willfully discarded for conquest, genocide, 
and dispossession. They might be shallowly or selectively functional until historical resentments, 
current power struggles, or competition for resources gives political opportunists an opening with 
violent consequences, as in Germany in the 1930s, or in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda in 
the 1990s. The details in all their variety are crucial for reparations in any particular case. But 
a common factor is that reparations typically seek repair in a context where accountability and 
reciprocity themselves are at issue (Walker 2014). 
Accountability is the relationship in which we see each other as answerable to each other under 
some common standards-whether I can reprimand you for your table manners, or insist on an 
apology for your lack of consideration, or take you to court for a breach of contract. Accountability 
relations can take formal legal or institutional forms, but upholding common standards of any 
kind-from etiquette to human rights-requires accountability between us. If you have the power 
to be unmoved by my demands, to be indifferent to the harms you cause me, or even to retaliate 
against me for presuming that I can hold you to account, we do not stand in this most basic moral 
and social relations. And if I have the privilege of assuming that what goes for me need not go 
for you-that I deserve protection but you deserve none; that I can demand your respect, but 
you may not expect mine-we are not in a relationship of reciprocity at some level, perhaps 
even at the level of human decency. It is the absence of accountability and reciprocity that lies 
at the root of the kinds of gross violations and profound harms to which programs of reparations 
respond. I suggest that signifying the possibility of a relationship of accountability and reciprocity 
where there has been none, or where it has been dangerously unreliable, is the fundamental task 
of reparations-to which all its varied measures are a means. In some cases substantial material 
restitution or compensation will be indispensable but it will never by itself be enough unless it is 
accompanied by other measures that signify clear acknowledgment, responsibility, and the intent to 
do justice (Walker 2013 ). This is something we can begin to see in the new practice of reparations. 
It is also visible in a spreading rejection of the corrective justice or "tort model" of reparations 
and in the emergence of related but contending accounts of reparative justice. Erik Yamamoto, 
Sandra Kim, and Abigail Holden see international practice as a model of "remaking societal 
understandings of who is worthy of redress" (Yamamoto et al. 2007: 74). David Gray writes that 
the reparations must aim at new social and material conditions in order to "achieve a sustainable 
new equilibrium among members of groups," and to situate victims "as individuals capable of 
being wronged" (Gray 2010b, 1101-102). Pablo De Greiff argues that reparations must aim at 
recognition of victims as bearers of rights, and at reestablishing trust between citizens and in their 
institutions, based on confidence that shared values and norms are real and regarded as binding 
on all (De Greiff 2006b ). In these views and others we see the beginning of a genuine project of 
theorizing reparative justice, creating a field of contending approaches with potentially different 
explanations of, and implications for, reparations practice. 
My own view of reparations emphasizes the central but neglected role of hope (Walker 2006b). 
Since reparations can only ever be particular measures or programs at particular times, they cannot 
bear the whole weight of actually remaking understandings, bringing about a new equilibrium, or 
establishing trust. They can only inspire a hopeful willingness for victims of injustice to believe in 
and to try for better relationships, if others will struggle towards an understanding of past wrongs 
and failed relationships, and accept the need for adequate gestures of amends for the past and 
strong guarantees for the future that truly reflect an engagement among equals. If others become 
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accountable-by actually accounting and making amends-then hope is reasonable, and it becomes 
possible to seek equilibrium, build trust, and operate on a premise ofbasically respectful treatment. 
Reorienting reparations to the issue of reconstructing relationships-socially, legally, and 
economically-might in turn let us look more clearly at the real practical problems of reparations 
rather than at a set of repetitive academic debates. The real problem is what I will call the 
"reparations deficit." 
The Reparations Deficit 
Despite ever more refined and complex understandings of reparations that are reflected in the Basic 
Principles, not much, and not much that is truly attuned to actual needs, perceptions, and desires 
of victims of mass violence and injustice, is being done in the world in the way of reparations. The 
main reparations deficit is that reparations are the least favored among measures that are seen as 
"transitional justice." A recently published data-base on transitional justice measures around the 
globe finds that financial reparations trail far behind either criminal trials or truth commissions; 
all trail miserably behind some forms of amnesty-an official policy to just the close books and 
move on (Olsen et al. 2010, Appendix 4). Ruben Carranza, Director of the Reparative Justice 
Program of the International Center for Transitional Justice, comments: "Reparations are arguably 
the most victim-centered of the various approaches to fighting impunity; but in recent years, most 
of the international resources meant for transitional justice and peacebuilding has gone to operating 
war crimes tribunals, occasionally to truth commissions, certainly to reintegrating ex-combatants, 
but seldom, if ever, to directly benefit victims of human rights violations" (Carranza 2009: 4). 
Reparations are a low priority domestically and internationally in both stable and transitional 
societies. The other deficit is one within current practices of reparations. Victims of violence 
and severe injustice who receive reparations receive little, have what they receive determined by 
others, and receive what those others decide it is affordable or efficient to provide (see Johnston 
and Slyomovics 2009 and Rubio-Marin 2009). 
If we ask why reparations happen so infrequently, amount to so little, and often fail to engage 
with actual needs and perspectives of the individuals and groups who seek justice, we need to 
understand what is at stake in reparations struggles, and it is by no means only money. I have 
suggested that restitution and compensation are often crucial instruments of reparations, but 
they are not, as the corrective justice model would have it, what is exclusively at stake. It is a 
renegotiation of relationship that reparations always symbolize and promise: they are an attempt 
in the present to acknowledge and repudiate what happened before, and to begin a transformation 
by attempting a first step, here and now, toward defining and creating relations of accountability 
and reciprocity. 
If a nation, institution, or group avoids making or refuses to make reparations in cases of gross 
abuse or manifest histories of severe injustice, they hold themselves, even now as before, beyond 
accountability to the people they have injured or whose mistreatment it falls to their society to 
repair. They see themselves as having the power to refuse demands of justice from those who 
deserve reparations. Since compelling calls for reparations come from those who have suffered 
histories of injustice that have degraded their status socially and economically, or who have borne 
the brunt of conflict because their economic or social vulnerability, they are generally not in a 
strong position to compel the fulfillment of their claims. If a nation, institution, or group attempts 
reparations without seeking to hear and understand the needs and perspectives of those who would 
receive reparations then there is a failure of reciprocity. Those who would decide reparations based 
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solely on their own perspective and assessment of what is due and what they are willing to offer, 
reserve the right to decide for others rather than with them the nature and meaning of the victims' 
losses. Even now as before, they do not show a willingness to meet the others on the ground of 
shared standards and mutual responsibility. 
Accountability and reciprocity are the basic terms of moral relationship, and they are what 
reparations, whatever form they take, must try to signify. If a struggle for reparations begins to 
engage, it is a medium for beginning to move forward toward a picture of what relationships 
of accountability and reciprocity might look like where they have not existed before. Unlike an 
exercise of corrective justice that "settles up" and closes the case, reparations open that passageway. 
They are the beginning, not the end, of a different history. But they are only a beginning and it is 
beyond the scope of reparations themselves to do more than exemplifY, through meaningful and 
costly deeds, a promise to reconstruct relations; the achievement may take decades or generations 
to secure. To understand the resistance within societies to negotiating in the present a mutual 
understanding of just relations-taking responsibility for a shameful past and making uncertain but 
hopeful commitments to a better future-is to appreciate what a remarkable, iffragile and limited, 
achievement reparations are. 
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